An Issue of Teaching Critical Thinking: Argument or Inquiry?Insights from Russell, Dewey and Toulmin
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摘要: 二十世纪初期罗素对杜威“逻辑”的批评,在今天体现着学术界对批判性思维(以及创新思维)教育的一种分歧,即,教人论证,还是教人探究?本文从“克里福德原则”引入在早期分析哲学家中流行的一种论证观念,进而考察罗素与杜威关于“探究”观念的著名争议及其“无果而终”的尴尬结局。借助于当代教育思想家图尔敏的广义论证观念,重新审视杜威的“探究理论”,可以澄清罗素对于杜威的批评何以是一种方法论上的(而非只是文本上的)误解。本文在教育哲学上的结论并非“要么论证要么探究”,因为当我们坚持从广义上理解“论证”一词时,“教人论证”与“教人探究”实乃可以彼此沟通与转化的教育目标;但从语用修辞上看,由于“探究”一词强调参与论证之人要从生动的经验中发现问题并在开放的经验中探索问题解决之道,它有助于防止或纠正教师和学生把论证狭隘地理解为语言诡辩或文本游戏。Abstract: Russell’s critique against Dewey’s new logic in the early 20th century is a symbol of some controversy over the orientation of critical thinking training. This article sets out from a conception of argument popular in earlier analytic philosophy, exemplified by the Principle of Clifford, and thereby examines the historical quarrel over “inquiry” between Russell and Dewey and its embarrassing outcome. After introducing the new conception of argument propounded eminently by Stephen Toulmin and embedding it in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, it is showed in what sense Russell’s criticism against Dewey was based upon some serious misunderstanding of Dewey’s methodology as well as of his key texts. At last, for the viewpoint of philosophy of education, this article suggests that the conception of argument-as-inquiry has the advantage of emphasizing arguers’ engaging in a variety of living experience and warning them against converting academic arguments into some sort of linguistic games.
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Key words:
- argument /
- inquiry /
- critical thinking /
- ideas of education
1) ①在《逻辑:探究的理论》一书中(Dewey, 1938,p. 9),杜威明确把自己的基本立场归功于皮尔士;而作为本书早期源头的《逻辑理论研究》(Dewey, 1916),杜威则将其题献给詹姆斯,以显示他对自己相关思想的深刻影响。2) ②需要提醒,当我们看到此种学术论战时要意识到:一方对于另一方的批评往往与他们对于对手的尊重联系在一起。詹姆斯在《相信的意志》一文中毫不掩饰对于克里福德的赞赏,称之为“一位经常让大人难堪但却令人开心的诚实孩子”(James, 1956, p. 8)。同样地,罗素对于杜威曾如是说:“杜威……普遍被认为是美国首屈一指的在世哲学家。我完全认同这种评价。他已经产生了深远影响,不仅仅是在哲学家中间,而且也在教育、美学、政治理论研究方面。他是品格极其高尚的一个人,具有自由宽宏的视野,与人慷慨和善,工作上孜孜不倦。”(Russell, 1996, p. 730)3) ③杜威对于罗素的早期回应包含在他为《杜威哲学》一书撰写的文章《经验、知识与价值:一种答辩》中(Dewey, 1958,pp. 568—574)。4) ④从现代形式逻辑的角度看,越是简单的系统越容易做到“无矛盾”,而当我们可以在某个系统内确定地谈论任意两个命题之间是否不一致时,往往意味着这个系统不够丰富,至少已经排除了某些类型的命题。5) ⑤当然,笔者也不认为,对于何谓探究,何谓论证,我们可以完全随意地界定。事实上,假若非要挖掘罗素与杜威之争背后的深层分歧的话,关键术语的规范用法应该是其中之一。二人不仅对于“真理”和“知识”的用法不同,对于“探究”的用法也不完全一样。虽然罗素反对杜威的“探究”观念,但他晚年在一篇题为“探究的精神”的文章(Russell, 1997)中明确将“探究”作为褒义词使用。这些有关哲学术语使用习惯或规则的争论,不仅构成了罗素与杜威时代学术实践中的一种“问题情境”,至今仍是当代哲学共同体中的重要议题之一。更多相关讨论,可参看张留华(2016)。6) ⑥杜威的“探究”观念对于教育的相关性不只在于批判性思维训练,新近著作(Johnston, 2009)总结出杜威的“探究”理论对于一般意义的学校教育的三大优势:敏感性、自我修正性以及问题驱动性。 -
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