具身-生成的意识经验：神经现象学的透视

陈巍; 郭本禹

具身-生成的意识经验：神经现象学的透视

陈巍¹,
郭本禹²

1.
绍兴文理学院心理学系，绍兴 312000
2.
南京师范大学心理学院，南京 210097

基金项目:

2010年度教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目 10YJC720052

2011年度南京师范大学全国优秀博士学位论文培养项目 2011BS0003

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出版历程
- 刊出日期: 2012-09-20

Embodied-Enactive Conscious Experience: A Perspective from Neurophenomenology

Chen Wei¹,
Guo Benyu²

摘要

摘要: 意识现象的特殊性使得认知科学亟需一种全新的研究进路来整合意识的主观性及其神经生物学基础。神经现象学主张将现象学与神经科学结合起来探索意识经验，并基于自我感、自主感与拥有感、幻觉性身体拥有等研究证据论证了意识经验是具身-生成的。意识具有主观性或经验性，其不仅依赖于生物体的具身结构，而且延展与嵌入到外部世界之中，并通过脑内大尺度神经活动而生成。虽然上述设想仍然存在争议，但却在科学研究背景下拉近了意识经验与大脑活动之间的认识论与方法论距离。
- 神经现象学 /
- 意识经验 /
- 具身-生成 /
- 自我感 /
- 自主感 /
- 拥有感

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图 1 异己手实验的操作示意图(转引自Sørensen, 2005, p. 75)

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参考文献(29)

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